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Defendant-Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
On December Yd, 2012 Plaintiff filed a new complaint even though the complaint was 
signed Four (4) weeks earlier (November 5t\ 2012) and was issued a summons. On January 24th, 
2013 my son was handed a summons and complaint and was not on the property located at 1681 
Ruby Creek Road at the time of delivery. In good faith, on the 8th of February, 2013, I filed a 
Notice of Special Appearance in accord with IRCP Rule 4(i)(2). By the 2l5t of February, 2013, 
still no Affidavit of Service was filed with the Court, I filed the Motion to Dismiss contesting 
Service. Attached with the Motion to Dismiss was a Memorandum in Support and Three (3) 
Affidavits in Support. A hearing date was scheduled for May 7th, 2013, on the Motion to Dismiss. 
Also discovery was sent to Plaintiff to figure out whether or not they had standing. Respondent 
finally files on the 25th of February, 2013 an untrue Affidavit of Service stating that my son is a 
co-resident of 1681 Ruby Creek Road in an attempt to cover up his failure to properly serve the 
Appellant in accord with IRCP Rule 4(d)(2). On March 15th, 2013, I received a Response to my 
Discovery, which showed that Plaintiff did not have standing to sue on behalf of Chase Bank 
USA. I was too sick to appear and notified the Court on May 3rd, 2013, to table the Motion. 
Because service was not accomplished by June yct, 2013 as required by IRCP Rule 4(a) 
(2), the Motion to Dismiss was not noticed up for hearing by the Appellant. The Court failed to 
dismiss the case sua sponte. Since February of 2013, Respondent could have attempted to serve 
me, but chose not to. As of June 41\ 2013, no service was made and there was no jurisdiction for 
the Court to act further. Also the case lacked activity for the continue to have jurisdiction. There 
was no notification of that either in accord with IRCP Rule 40( c ). 
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Because there was no jurisdiction for the Court to act, I chose to not participate and stand 
ground on the issue that Service was not done. I am also asserting now, that the Respondent has 
no standing to bring the action and that the Court is also barred from determining the initial 
complaint due to principles of illegality of contract being unenforceable by the court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Appellant requests that the Court review the record to see if there was proper service 
on the Appellant in accord with IRCP Rule 4(d)(l) & (2). The Appellant requests that the Court 
review the record to see if service was done in accord IRCP Rule 4(a)(2). The Appellant requests 
that the Court review the record to see if the Court lost jurisdiction due to improper service, 
improper complaint, failure to dismiss complaint for IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) violations, illegality of 
contract issues surrounding Respondent and/or the trial court, standing issues surrounding 
Respondent and/or the trial court pursuant to IRCP Rule 17(a), did Judges Mitchell and Yerby 
have proper authority to preside on this case in any capacity when the case was assigned to Judge 
Buchanan, and if not does any determinations, rulings, orders, judgments made by them void or 
voidable for lack of jurisdiction, whether there is a violation of due process and equal protection 
standards in both the State and National constitutions due to trial court error. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Appellant claims attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R Rule 40 in conjunction with chapter 1 of 
Title 12, more specifically described as I.C. § 12-114. 
Additionally, Appellant claims Attorney Fees pursuant to I.A.R. 4l(d) which states in part 
to wit: 
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The claim for attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include 
paralegal fees shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the method of 
computation of the attorney fees claimed. 
For a great part of this case the Appellant has secured the assistance of a 
paralegal/specialized legal assistant to do most of his writing, research, and preparation of oral 
arguments before the court. Appellant asserts that should he prevail on Appeal he should be able 
to get attorney fees for his services as provided by the paralegal/specialized legal assistant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Application of Court Rules 
A. Authority 
Generally speaking when discussing due process of law as it applies to the mechanics of 
the courts of this State, due process refers to substantive rule making and procedural rule making. 
Substantive rule making is the creation of courts and its jurisdiction which is exclusively reserved 
to the Legislative Department. Procedural rule making can be done by either the Legislative or 
Judicial Department, unless the subject matter is strictly reserved to the Legislative Department, 
as seen in Constitution of the State of Idaho in Article V, Sections 2, 9 and 13 which states to wit: 
Section 2. Judicial power -- Where vested. The judicial power of the state shall be 
vested in a court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court, district courts, 
and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as established by the 
legislature. The courts shall constitute a unified and integrated judicial system for 
administration and supervision by the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of such 
inferior courts shall be as prescribed by the legislature. Until provided by law, no 
changes shall be made in the jurisdiction or in the manner of the selection of 
judges of existing inferior courts. [Emphasis Added] 
Section 9. Original and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of the district 
courts, or the judges thereof, any order of the public utilities commission, any 
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order of the industrial accident board, and any plan proposed by the commission 
for reapportionment created pursuant to section 2, article III; the legislature may 
provide conditions of appeal, scope of appeal, and procedure on appeal from 
orders of the public utilities commission and of the industrial accident board. 
On appeal from orders of the industrial accident board the court shall be limited 
to a review of questions of law. The Supreme Court shall also have original 
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas 
corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate 
jurisdiction. [Emphasis Added] 
Section 13. Power of legislature respecting courts. The legislature shall have no 
power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which 
rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the 
legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law,. 
when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of 
all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done 
without conflict with this Constitution, provided, however, that the legislature 
can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence 
imposed shall be not less than the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any 
mandatory minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced. [Emphasis Added] 
No matter whether a rule of procedure is created by the Legislative or Judicial 
Departments, it is required by the Constitution of the State of Idaho that such rules must be 
general and uniform throughout the State. This sentiment is expressed in Article V, Section 26 of 
the Constitution of the State ofldaho, which states to wit: 
Section 26. Court procedure to be general and uniform. All laws relating to courts 
shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state, and the organized 
judicial powers, proceedings, and practices of all the courts of the same class or 
grade, so far as regulated by law, and the force and effect of the proceedings, 
judgments, and decrees of such courts, severally, shall be uniform. 
This requirement is necessary to ensure that due process and equal protection of the law 
standards are guaranteed to everybody in the State and is expressed in Article I, Declaration of 
Rights in Sections 1, 2, 13, 18, and 21. Also, the State is mandated to guarantee everybody in this 
State the Rights as contained in the Bill of Rights in Amendment to the Constitution of the 
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United States of America. 
Before the State of Idaho was a State of the Union and was called the Territory of Idaho , 
the federal government handled all substantive and procedural issues through legislation. So the 
laws on court procedures where codified in the Territorial Laws of the Territory of Idaho. When 
the Territory of Idaho was accepted as a State and became the State of Idaho, the Courts of the 
State had the power to create procedural law in the furtherance of the Court. This was recognized 
by the Legislature with the following excerpts from two cases to wit: 
"Our legislature has recognized and confirmed the procedural rule-making power 
of the Supreme Court. LC.§§ 1-212, 1-213 .... This occurred in 1941. 
LC.§ 1-212 provides: 
Rule-making power recognized. The inherent power of the Supreme 
Court to make rules governing procedure in all the courts of Idaho is 
hereby recognized and confirmed. 
LC. § 1-213 provides: 
Duty to make rules Limitation. The Supreme Court shall prescribe, 
by general rules, for all the courts of Idaho, the forms of process, writs, 
pleadings and motions, the manner of service, time for appearance, and the 
practice and procedure in all actions and proceedings. Said rules shall 
neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant." 
cf State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 700 P.2d 942 at 943-44 (1985); R.E. W Construction Inc. 
v. District Court of Third Judicial District, 88 Idaho 426, 400 P.2d 390 (1965). many of the 
procedures dealing with the Court as stated in the laws for the Territory of Idaho, which was re-
titled as the laws of the State of Idaho were supplanted with Court Rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Idaho. On or about 1975, the Supreme Court adopted most of the series of 
Federal Court Rules, inclusive of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). 
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After several amendments to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, we have today these 
rules for service of process on individuals starts in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4( d)(l) which 
details the use of the summons and begins the mandatory instructions on how personal service is 
to be accomplished, to wit: 
"A copy of the complaint shall be served with the summons, except when the 
service is by publication as provided in Rule 4( e ). The plaintiff shall furnish the 
person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made 
as follows: [Emphasis Added] I.R.C.P. Rule 4( d)(l) 
"Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4( d)(2) details the requirements for personal service upon 
individuals as follows: 
Upon an individual other than those specified in subdivision (3) of this rule, by 
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual 
personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual 
place of abode with some person over the age of eighteen (18) years then residing 
therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process." 
cf1 Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 78 P.3d 379 (2003). 
This appeal is primarily a question of whether there is sufficient service of process. 
B. Liberal Construction of the Court Rules and Service of Process Rules. 
In the last sentence of Rule 1 ( a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states, "These rules 
shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding." I know of no case which defines what exactly the terms "liberally 
construed" means, but the terms "liberal construction" has been decided to include these 
parameters in the case of Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 587 P.2d 1245 (1978) in which the Court 
1 cf means "cited from." 
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stated, 
"The 'liberal construction' of the rules required by Rule 1, while it cannot alter 
compliance which is mandatory and jurisdictional, will ordinarily preclude 
dismissal of an appeal for that which is but technical noncompliance." c.f Bunn v. 
Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 587 P.2d 1245 (1978). 
Due to the nature of the question of service, and service being both mandatory and jurisdictional 
in nature, liberal construction of what Rule 4( d) states cannot be liberally construed, but must be 
strictly construed. I started with the language in Rule 4(d)(l) because it states that "Service shall 
be done as follows." "The manner in which the summons and original complaint in a civil action 
are to be served is specified in Rule 4(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." c.f Rudd v. 
Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003). Even though the word "shall" has been decided by 
the courts to mean in statute to be "mandatory", "The word shall, when used in a statute, is 
mandatory. Munroe v. Sullivan Mining Co., 69 Idaho 348, 207 P.2d 54 7 (1949); Pierce v. 
Vialpando, 78 Idaho 274,301 P.2d 1099 (1956)." c.f Paolini v. Albertson's Inc, 143 Idaho 547, 
149 P.3d 822 (2006); Gilbert v. Moore, 108 Idaho 165, 697 P.2d 1179 (1985); Goffv. HJH Co., 
95 Idaho 837, 521 P.2d 661 (1974), "This Court has held on many occasions that the word 'shall' 
denotes a mandatory, not a discretionary act." See Madison v. JI Morgan, Inc., 115 Idaho 141, 
144, 765 P.2d 652,655 (1988). When the term "shall" was used in Rules ll(b)(3) and 54(e)(3) 
This Court determined that the word "shall" denoted mandatory act(s). "The rule, employing the 
term "shall," is mandatory-it requires the court to consider all eleven factors plus any other 
factor the court deems appropriate." c.f Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 111 P.3d 110 
(2005). I am of the opinion that "There are rules, and, particularly, 'shall' rules I think have to be 
complied with, and courts themselves are places where rules are followed." c.f Sammis v. 
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Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941 P.2d 314 (1997). Rules 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(2) are part of the 
"shall" rules, which requires mandatory acts to be in accordance with these expressed Court 
Rules. 
II. Service of Process on Individuals Requirements 
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4( d)(2) there are three methods for 
service on an individual. They are: 1) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to 
the individual personally; 2) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint by 
leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some 
person over the age of eighteen (18) years then residing therein; [Emphasis Added] and lastly 3) 
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive service of process. "Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) provides that 
service upon an individual is proper if the summons and complaint are delivered to the individual 
personally or left at their residence with an authorized person, or by delivering a copy of the 
summons and complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 
process." c.f Sivak v. Idaho Department of Corrections, Docket No. 39013, 2012 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 522. (2012). 
It is not in dispute that the Appellant was not personally served. In other words the 
summons and complaint was never placed into the hands of the Appellant by the process server 
employed by the Respondent. And I do not believe that it is in dispute that summons and 
complaint was never placed into the hands of an agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process. So, the issue of whether service of process was accomplished in 
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accord with option 2 in IRCP Rule 4( d)(2) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the 
complaint by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode 
with some person over the age of eighteen ( 18) years then residing therein; [Emphasis Added] is 
contested by Appellant and most likely by Respondent. 
III. Time Line, It's Importance and Errors Committed. 
As mentioned in the Statement of Facts the time line from the initial filing of the 
complaint until a few days before trial is important to go over again, this time in detail. Using the 
ROA, R Vol. I, pages 9 - 10, and is incorporated herein by its reference. 
On December 3rct, 2012 Plaintiff filed a new complaint even though the complaint was 
signed Four (4) weeks earlier (November 51\ 2012) and was issued a summons. The case was 
assigned to District Court Judge Steven Verby. ROA, R Vol. I, page 9. Respondent had Six (6) 
months to serve the summons and complaint on the Appellant in accord with IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) 
which is jurisdictional and mandatory. IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) states to wit: 
(2) Time Limit for Service. If a service of the summons and complaint is not 
made upon a defendant within six (6) months after the filing of the complaint and 
the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why 
such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to 
that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with 14 days 
notice to such party or upon motion. IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) 
Mandatory compliance with IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) for service of the summons and complaint ended 
on June 3rd, 2013 or the Court is under mandate to dismiss the case pursuant to IRCP Rule 4(a) 
(2). This is not a discretionary act. "As a matter of policy, any jurisdictional consequence of a 
rule should be plainly expressed in the rule itself. Loss of jurisdiction should not be a subtle 
creature of inference, lurking as a threat to the unwary." c.f Wardv. Lupinacci, 111 Idaho 40, 41, 
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720 P.2d 223, 224 (Ct.App. 1986). "'There are rules, and, particularly, 'shall' rules I think have to 
be complied with, and courts themselves are places where rules are followed.' Rule 4(a)(2) is 
couched in mandatory language, requiring dismissal where a party does not comply, absent a 
showing of good cause. c.f Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941 P.2d 314 (1997). 
On January 24t\ 2013 my son was handed a summons and complaint and was not on the 
property located at 1681 Ruby Creek Road at the time of delivery. IRCP Rule 4(i)(2) states to 
wit: 
(2) Motion or Special Appearance to Contest Personal Jurisdiction. A motion 
under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5), whether raised before or after judgment, a motion 
under Rule 40( d)(l) or (2), or a motion for an extension of time to answer or 
otherwise appear does not constitute a voluntary appearance by the party under 
this rule. The joinder of other defenses in a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5) 
does not constitute a voluntary appearance by the party under this rule. After a 
party files a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5), action taken by that party in 
responding to discovery or to a motion filed by another party does not constitute a 
voluntary appearance. If, after a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, 
the party pleads further and defends the action, such further appearance and 
defense of the action will not constitute a voluntary appearance under this rule. 
The filing of a document entitled "special appearance" which does not seek any 
relief but merely provides notice that the party is entering a special appearance to 
contest personal jurisdiction, does not constitute a voluntary appearance by the 
party under this rule if the party files a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) 
within fourteen (14) days after filing such document, or within such later time as 
the court permits. IRCP Rule 4(i)(2) and is incorporated herein by its reference. 
By the 8th of February, 2013, I filed a Notice of Special Appearance in accord with IRCP 
Rule 4(i)(2) which automatically gave me 14 more days to file a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 
IRCP Rule 12(b)(2),(4), & (5). See IRCP Rule 4(i)(2) and ROA, R Vol. I, page 9. Pursuant to 
IRCP Rule 4(i)(2) no general appearance was made. 
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Judge Yerby quit2 as District Court Judge to supposedly head for retirement and was 
replaced with newly appointed District Court Judge Barbara Buchanan as noted in the ROA as a 
"(batch process)" on February 181, 2013. Also Two (2) weeks had gone by and no Affidavit of 
Service was filed with the Court. 
By the 21 st of February, 2013, still no Affidavit of Service was filed with the Court, I filed 
the Motion to Dismiss contesting Service, R. Vol. I, pages 18-20, attached with a Memorandum 
in Support, R. Vol. I, pages 21-23, and Three (3) Affidavits in Support. See R. Vol I, pages 24-29 
and are incorporated herein by its reference. A hearing date was scheduled for May 7th , 2013. 
Also discovery was sent to Plaintiff to figure out whether or not they had standing. Still there is 
no general appearance on my part to constitute a waiver in accord with IRCP Rule 4(i)(2). In the 
affidavits that I filed, the affiants all testified that my son does NOT reside at 1681 Ruby Creek 
Road, since 2011, which is still true today. The affiants all testified that my son does NOT act as 
our (my husband and myself) agent to accept service of process. 
After these facts that my son does NOT reside at 1681 Ruby Creek Road and my son does 
NOT act as our (my husband and myself) agent to accept service of process was established on 
the case record - R. Vol I, pages 24-29, the Respondent finally files on the 25th of February, 2013 
an untrue Affidavit of Service stating that my son is a co-resident of 1681 Ruby Creek Road in an 
attempt to cover up his failure to properly serve the Appellant in accord with IRCP Rule 4( d)(2). 
2 This is important, because I would have automatically disqualified him due to his poor reputation. Him suddenly 
quitting his post I thought he must have been accused of something, like his predecessor. Also, it was common 
knowledge that he had a high rate of automatic disqualifications or self imposed disqualifications, which left me 
with the feeling he was either incompetent or didn't perform well to the ends of proper justice or both. 
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On March 151\ 2013, I received a Response to my Discovery, which showed that Plaintiff 
did not have standing to sue on behalf of Chase Bank USA, nor were they assignees of Chase 
Bank USA, and nor were they third party beneficiaries as part of any alleged the contract entered 
in the State of Idaho between Chase Bank USA and I, nor was there ANY agreement entered in 
the State of Idaho between Chase Bank USA and I to have my financial information disclosed to 
any third party(ies). 
Art. I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution .... provides: 
"Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded 
for every injury of person, property or character, and rights and justice shall be 
administered without sale, denial, delay or prejudice." 
c.f Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976). It is hardly effective for 
a Court to be open to every person, if only attorneys get heard and the judge on the bench falls 
asleep when the individual appearing in propria persona speaks to the Court for relief or to 
defend himself/herself. In the First Judicial District the appearance of this disrespect is more than 
an appearance it is actually occurring. In this case the disrespect was shown in the application of 
IRCP Rule 7(b)(4) wherein location of the parties was used to deny telephonic appearances even 
though location of the parties is not discussed in the rule. This impartiality to due process cannot 
be met if being heard is not done in a meaningful manner via equal access to a telephonic hearing 
under IRCP Rule 7(b )( 4). I am tried of being abused by the court that is unjust in the application 
of its rules, which favors attorneys over in propria persona litigants. This is especial true when 
the Court expects in propria persona litigants to follow the rules of court as if we are trained 
attorneys. As in propria persona litigants we expect to receive the same benefits or relief from 
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the rules of court as does an attorney receive. I think that is not unreasonable to request. As a 
result by the conduct of the presiding judge, I was not afforded the same opportunity as was 
given to the attorney for the Respondent, and I was prejudiced as a result, due to my illness. 
"Procedural due process "basically requires that a person, whose protected rights are 
being adjudicated, is afforded an opportunity to be heard in a timely manner." Powers v. Canyon 
County. 108 Idaho 967, 969, 703 P.2d 1342, 1344 (1985). There must be notice and the 
opportunity to be heard must "occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner .... " 
Cowan v. Bd. o(Comm'rs, 143 Idaho 501,512, 148 P.3d 1247, 1258 (2006) (quotingAberdeen-
Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91,982 P.2d 917,926 (1999)) (internal quotations 
omitted)." c.f Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Investments, LLC., 145 Idaho 360, 
179 P.3d 323 (2008). 
In April of 2013, I established a double standard and prejudice of Judge Buchanan. When 
an attorney requests to be heard telephonically it is granted, but when someone is appearing in 
propria persona and does not have an attorney at their side the same request is denied. R. Vol I, 
pages 36-38 and 45-48, respectfully. Also, the Respondent removed my husband from the case 
and amended the caption, R. Vol I, pages 41-43, due to their thinking that service was done and 
they no longer needed him for service issues. I was too sick to appear and notified the Court on 
May 3r\ 2013, to table the Motion. R. Vol I, pages 51-52. Still there is no general appearance on 
my part to constitute a waiver in accord with IRCP Rule 4(i)(2). 
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Also this series of events showed me that Judge Buchanan was not impartial and was 
biased and prejudiced against the Appellant. 
Service was not accomplished by June 3rd, 2013 as required by IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) and the 
Court failed to dismiss the case either. Since February of 2013, Respondent could have attempted 
to serve me, but chose not to. As of June 41\ 2013, no service was made and there was no 
jurisdiction for the Court to act further. 
"'If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he must keep out for 
all purposes except to make that objection.' Pingree Cattle Loan Co. v. Charles J Webb & Co., 
36 Idaho 442, 446, 211 P. 556, 557 (1922) (quoting from Lowe v. Stringham, 14 Wis. 222 
(1861) ) .... Rule 4(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure mitigates to some extent the rule that 
the party must keep out for all purposes except to object that he is not in court." c.f Rhino 
Metals, Inc., v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319, 193 P.3d 866 (2008). After June Yd, 2013, I did not 
participate, except to notify the Court of that fact. 
"The service of the summons confers the court with personal jurisdiction over a party. 
Engleman v. Milanez, 137 Idaho 83, 84, 44 P.3d 1138, 1139 (2002). 
"Personal jurisdiction refers to the court's authority to adjudicate the claim as to 
the person. That a court has "jurisdiction of a party" means either that a party has 
appeared generally and submitted to the jurisdiction, has otherwise waived 
service of process, or that process has properly issued and been served on such 
party." c.f State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 91 P.3d 1127 (2004) 
"Generally, where a party has not been served with process or was improperly 
served with process, any judgment against such party is void. Wells v. Valley Natl. 
Bank o(Arizona, 109 Ariz. 345, 509 P.2d 615 (1973). As we noted in Garren v .. 
Rollins, 85 Idaho 86, 375 P.2d 994 (1962): 
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Under the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States, a personal 
judgment rendered without service of process on, or legal notice to, a defendant, 
in the absence of a voluntary appearance or waiver is void, and not merely 
voidable. 
Thiel v. Stradley, 118 Idaho 86, 87, 794 P.2d 1142, 1143 (1990). Thus, a judgment taken in an 
action where service of process was not made, or improperly made, is void ... " cf Lohman v. 
Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 78 P.3d 379 (2003). 
There being neither lawful service of process upon nor a voluntary appearance before the 
court by any of the defendants, the district court was wholly without jurisdiction of the 
defendants. See Garren v. Rollins, 85 Idaho 86,375 P.2d 994 (1962). 
"Additionally, a judgment is void when a court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of 
power constituting a violation of due process. Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 647, 991 
P.2d 369, 372 (1998). The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and 
United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process be given 
meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 133 Idaho at 648, 991 P.2d at 373." 
cf McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 100 P.3d 621 (2004). 
The January 22nd, 2014 "status conference hearing", there no such animal in the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, this hearing was conducted not in Boundary County but in Bonner 
County, before someone other than Judge Buchanan who was not appointed to be on the case in 
violation of the public policy of this State and who decided the Motion to Dismiss wholly 
without jurisdiction, without proper Notice. From the looks of the Transcript the hearing was 
conducted telephonically from the Kootenai County Courthouse, before Judge John Mitchell who 
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was not assigned to this case by way of court order and was an interloper on the case which had 
no jurisdiction for its existence. 
"Procedural law is governed by state practice." cf Stobie v. Potlach Forrests, Inc., 95 
Idaho 666, 518 P 2d 1 (197 3). There is no practice in the Court Rules for constant switching out 
assigned judges for somebody else. IRCP Rule 1 ( c) makes it clear that the judges and magistrates 
cannot make up rules as they go. IRCP Rule states to wit in part: "No district court or magistrates 
division of the state shall make rules of procedure except as expressly authorized by these rules" 
The only person who can stop this nonsense is the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho by 
enforcing its rules and creating new ones to restrict judges from this type of ulta vires behavior. 
Keeping in mind that Judge Mitchell who is also not assigned to this case through Court 
order, unlawfully and in excess of his jurisdiction conducted the "status conference hearing" not 
recognized in the IRCP and in violation of IRCP Rule 1 ( c ). 
Then, Judge Verby who had been taken off this case and was replaced with Judge 
Buchanan, was acting wholly without jurisdiction by his actions to interfere with this case by 
ruling on my Motion to Dismiss from Bonner County. Not even the ROA properly shows what 
had happened. 
But it seems, by the what took place through this unlawful and unauthorized "status 
conference" that emphasis was given and taken by the Judges Mitchell and Verby that somehow 
using discovery procedures is considered a general appearance even though the rules and case 
law would suggest otherwise. 
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In the Court Rules the filing of discovery is not a pleading as outlined in IRCP Rule 7(a) 
to constitute a general appearance under IRCP Rule 4(i)(2). Due process requires notice and no 
notice is given in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure that using discovery methods is considered 
to be a general appearance. Appellant has not made a general appearance in this case. Even 
though Judge Verby's conduct is the tampering with the administration of justice, if he had read 
his own case citations, this concept that discovery does not constitute a general appearance is 
clearly stated in Roy v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 488, 127 Cal.App.4th 377, at n9 (2005), a 
case he cites in his illegitimate ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, wherein it states to wit: "If a 
defendant does need to engage in discovery, he may do so without being deemed to have made a 
general appearance. (See Harding v. Harding, (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 626, 636, 121 Cal/Rptr.2d 
450.)" Clearly the Appellant has not made a general appearance in this case. As usual the merits 
of the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss for lack of proper service was not determined and of 
course the mandatory dismissal under IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) was also not done, in error. 
Unauthorized Judge Verby in his quest to interfere with the administration of justice did 
conduct a hearing outside of the County in which the action was brought, who has no 
authorization to be assigned to the above entitled case from the Supreme Court and 
Administrative Judge for the 1st Judicial District, who conducted a foreign hearing not in accord 
with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure called a "Status Conference", made arbitrary and 
capricious determinations not in accord with the laws of this State and did deprive the Appellant 
of due process of law and equal protection under the law in violation of Sections 13, 18 of Article 
1 of the Constitution of the State ofldaho and the 6th and 14th Amendments of the Bill of Rights 
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of the Constitution of the United States of America. Isn't that enough to reverse and dismiss this 
case. 
On January 27th, 2014, once again Judge Mitchell conducted a trial who was without 
authority to preside over the case, as he was not assigned to the in which Judge Buchanan was. 
Given that privilege. Judge Buchanan not being incapacitated in any way or suffering the way of 
death (at least yet) or being disqualified with or without cause, there was no reason for an 
unauthorized substitute not recognized in the Court Rules and in fact in violation of IRCP Rule 
l(c). Due to this impediment the determinations and judgments entered as a result of Judge 
Mitchell acting wholly without jurisdiction or justification is void ab initio. 
"Under the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States, a personal 
judgment rendered without service of process on, or legal notice to, a defendant, in the absence 
of a voluntary appearance or waiver is void, and not merely voidable. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 
U.S. 90, 37 S.Ct. 343, 344, 61 L.Ed. 608. A judgment cannot be based on void service of process. 
Ennis v. Casey, 72 Idaho 181, 238 P.2d 435, 28 A.L.R.2d 952. Due process of law envisions 
opportunity upon reasonable notice for a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. Yellowstone 
Pipe Line Co. v. Drummond, 77 Idaho 36, 287 P.2d 288. A void judgment is a nullity, and no 
rights can be based thereon; it can be set aside on motion or can be collaterally attacked at any 
time. Miller v. Prout, 33 Idaho 709, 197 P. 1023. Jensen v. Gooch. 36 Idaho 457,211 P. 551. 30A 
Am.Jur. 198, Judgments, § 45. For a valid execution to issue it must be supported by a valid 
judgment. Apple v. Edwards, 123 Mont. 135, 211 P.2d 138; 33 C.J.S. Executions§ 8, p. 141." c.f 
Garren v. Rollins, 85 Idaho 86,375 P.2d 994 (1962). 
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IV. Standing. 
"Courts have the power to inquire into their 0vvn jurisdiction; they are obligated to ensure 
their own subject matter jurisdiction and must raise the issue sua sponte if necessary." In re City 
of Shelly, 151 Idaho 289, 25 5 P.3d 117 5 (2011 ); Laughy v. Idaho Department of Transp., 149 
Idaho 867, 233 P.3d 1055 (2010). "A court has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subject 
matter jurisdiction over a case." State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 244 P.3d 1244 (2010). "The a 
court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case is a question of law, and maybe raised at any time." Dunlap 
v. State, 146 Idaho 197, 192 P.3d 1021 (2008). "The question of jurisdiction is fundamental and 
cannot be ignored; even if jurisdictional questions are not raised by the parties, the Supreme 
Court must address them on its own initiative." State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 246 P.3d 979 
(2011). "A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when brought to the 
attention of the court and should be addressed prior to considering the merits of an appeal." State 
v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 80 P.3d 1083 (2003). A real party in interest is jurisdictional as stated 
in IRCP Rule l 7(a). 
IRCP Rule 17(a) mandates that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest. Courts must hesitate before resolving the rights of those not parties to litigation. State v. 
Doe, 148 Idaho 919,231 P.3d 1016 (2010) citing Singleton v. Wolf, 428 U.S. 106, 113, 96 S.Ct. 
2868, 2873-74, 49 L.Ed.2d 826, 832-33 (1976). Where a Plaintiff does not have standing it 
cannot be said that the case or controversy requirement has been satisfied. Martin v. Camas 
County Ex Rel Rel. Bd. Com'rs. 150 Idaho 1243, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011). Without standing the 
judiciary lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. Martin v. Camas County Ex Rel Rel. Bd. Com'rs. 150 
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Idaho 1243, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011). 
A real party in interest "is the person who will be entitled to the benefits of the action if 
successful, one who is actually and substantially interested in the subject matter." Carrington v. 
Crandall, 63 Idaho 651,658, 124 P.2d 914,917 (1942). See Carl H Christensen Family Trust v.. 
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 870, 993 P.2d 1197, 1201(1999); State, Dep't of Law Enforcement v. 
One I 990 Geo Metro, 126 Idaho 675, 680, 889 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct.App.1995). 
It is common knowledge that only parties to a contract have standing to bring an action 
for breach of contract. See IRCP Rule 17(a). The Justices of the Supreme Court for the State of 
Idaho issued recently several decisions pertaining to who can bring an action for breach of 
contract. In Noak v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 152 Idaho 305, 271 P.3d 703 (2012), rehearing 
denied, the High Court held that "Only a party to a contract may assert a claim for breach of 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." and in Baccus v. Ameripride Services Inc., 145 Idaho 
346, 179 P.3d 309 (2008) the court held that "Contract obligations are imposed because of 
conduct of the parties manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific individuals named 
in the contract." Back in 1984 the justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho in Wing v. 
Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984), did hold that "'Party must look to 
person with whom he is in direct contractual relationship for relief, in the event that his 
expectations under contract are not met.' Citing Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 45, 539 P.2d 590, 
597 (1975); Minidoka County v. Krieger, 88 Idaho 395, 399, P.2d 962 (1965); Coburn v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 86 Idaho 415,387 P.2d 598 (1963)." 
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Other jurisdictions within the Pacific Reporter have jurisprudence on point as to who can 
bring an action such as this one for breach of contract. 
The justices of the Supreme Court State of Montana in the case of Thompson v. Lincoln 
Nat. Life Ins. Co., 114 Mont. 521, 138 P.2d 951, the court held that "A contract binds no one but 
parties thereto." And again in 1977 in the case of Gambles v. Perdue, 175 Mont. 112, 572 P.2d 
1241 the court held that "Obligation of contracts is limited to contracting parties. 
The justices of the Supreme Court for the State of New Mexico in Staley v. New, 56 N.M. 
756, 250 P.2d 893 (2011), the court held that "Generally, one who is not a party to a contract 
cannot maintain a suit upon it. 
The justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming in Cates v. Daniels, 628 P.2d 
862, the court held that "For one to be liable on a contract, he must be a party to the contract or 
must have given agent written authority to sign the agreement on his behalf." And again, in Ultra 
Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 226 P.3d 889 (2010), the court held "A stranger to a contract lacks 
standing to maintain an action upon it." 
The justices of the Court of Appeals of the State of Colorado in East Meadows Co., LLC 
v. Greeley Irr. Co., 66 P.3d 214 (2003), held that "The general rule is that one who is not a party 
to a contract, and from whom no consideration moved, has no connection therewith; he can avail 
himself of its terms neither as a cause of action nor a defense." 
The justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona m Lofts at Fillmore 
Condominium Ass'n v. Reliance Commercial Const., Inc., 218 Ariz 574, 190 P.3d 733 (2008), 
held that "As a general rule only the parties and privies to a contract may enforce it." 
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The justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma in Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. 
Heath, 280 P.3d 328, the court held that "Contracts are binding only upon those who are parties 
thereto, and are enforceable only by the parties to a contract or those in privity with it." 
As admitted by counsel for Respondent, Respondent is not the original creditor, nor are 
they an assignee of Chase Bank USA, See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Discovery Request 
for Admissions, Request No. 8, 14, 15 and is incorporated herein as Appendix "A". There is no 
nexus between the Appellant and Respondent. See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Discovery 
Request for Admissions, Request No. 23, 24. Plaintiffs Denies Admission Request No. 25, but no 
agreement was ever placed into the record at trial. Equally true there were no contracts between 
Chase Bank USA and the Appellant placed into the Court record either establishing a nexus 
between Chase Bank USA and the Appellant. Without the contracts between Chase Bank USA 
and the Appellant, Plaintiff could not establish that they are third party beneficiaries. Respondent 
has no evidentiary showing that they are entitled to any damages resulting from any alleged 
contractual relationship between Chase Bank USA and the Appellant. Simply put Respondent has 
no standing to sue on this issue of contract between Chase Bank USA and the Appellant. 
Respondent does not have "privity" with Appellant or Chase Bank USA, alleged original 
creditor. Person not in privity cannot sue on a contract. Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 
1172 (1984 ). Privity refers to those who exchange contractual promissory words or those to 
whom promissory words are directed. Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 1172 (1984). See 
also Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 234 Kan 742, 675 P.2d 887 (1965). I 
have no privity with the Respondent or counsel for the Respondent. 
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Furthermore, Respondent and the counsel for Respondent did not allege in the verified 
complaint that they are third-party beneficiaries to the alleged agreement between Chase Bank 
USA and the Appellant, and that such status as third-party beneficiary could only be established 
by Respondent by showing that the contract was primarily entered into for his benefit. See 
Parout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 183 P.3d 771 (2008). By absence of allegation in the complaint 
that Respondent is a third-party beneficiary by way of a contract with Chase Bank USA and the 
Appellant, indicates there was no intent expressed in any alleged contract with Chase Bank USA 
and the Appellant for the Respondent to be or become a third-party beneficiary. 
There is no assignment from Chase Bank USA to EGP Investments, Inc., to make this 
case a chose in action claim. "'Assignment' is defined as "the transfer of rights or property." 
Black's Law Dictionary 115 (7th ed.1999). American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, defines 
"assignment" as: 
... a transfer of property or some other right from one person (the 'assignor') to another (the 
'assignee'), which confers a complete and present right in the subject matter to the assignee. An 
assignment is a contract between the assignor and the assignee, and is interpreted or construed in 
accordance to rules of contract construction. 351 *351 Ordinarily, the word 'assignment' is limited 
in its application to a transfer of intangible rights, including contractual rights, choses in action, 
and rights in or connected with property, as distinguished from transfer of the property itself. 
According to the Restatement of Contracts, an assignment of a right is a manifestation of the 
assignor's intention to transfer it by virtue of which the assignor's right to performance by the 
obligor is extinguished in whole or in part and the assignee acquires a right to such performance. 
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6 Arn.Jur.2d Assignment § 1 (1999). 
To be effective, an assignment must be completed with a delivery, and the 
delivery must confer a complete and present right on the transferee. The assignor 
must not retain control over the property assigned, the authority to collect, or the 
power to revoke. 
6 Arn.Jur.2d Assignment § 132 (1999). 
Idaho recognizes that choses in action are generally assignable. AfcCluskev v. Galland, 95 
Idaho 472. 474-75, 511 P.2d 289, 291-92 (1973). An assignment may be done in such a way to be 
construed as a complete sale of the claim. 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignment§ 147 (1999). However, an 
assignment that is absolute in form can be shown to be for purposes of collection only. Id. In 
order to determine the intent of the assignment, the Court looks to the contract between the 
assignor and assignee. Id. An assignment of the chose in action transfers to the assignee and 
divests the assignor of all control and right to the cause of action, and the assignee becomes the 
real party in interest. McCluskey, 95 Idaho at 474, 511 P.2d at 291. Only the assignee may 
prosecute an action on the chose in action. Id." c.f Purco Fleet Services, Inc., v. Idaho 
Department of Finance, 140 Idaho 121, 90 P.3d 346 (2004) 
However, EGP Investments, Inc. admits that what they believe they purchased was 
"charge off' accounts. According to Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, page 193 the term 
"charge off' means to wit: 
"An accounting term for the elimination from assets of an item of corporeal 
property or of an account receivable, because of loss of value rendering the 
corporeal property worthless or the insolvency of the person indebted upon the 
account rendering it uncollectible. Rubinkam v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 149." 
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See also Jones v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 550; Commissioner v. MacDonald, 102 F.2d 942, 945; 
and Stephenson v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 348 citing Avery v. Commissioner 22 F.2d 6, 55 A.L.R. 
1277. The way a "charge off' account works is that Chase Bank USA declares on their tax return 
a loss on these accounts including the expenses for collection in which they receive a dollar-for-
dollar tax write off, eliminating any damages from the source, which is the contract. On top of 
that Chase Bank USA also made a claim to FSDLIC Insurance who gave that amount again on an 
insurance claim. So, Chase Bank USA at the very least doubles their "investment" which was 
nothing because it was the Federal Reserve System that created the credit out of thin air. All 
fraudulent and all illegal. 
Oh, but it gets better. Chase Bank USA literally sells a list of accounts which is nothing 
more than financial information of each cardholder to a third party information broker. In this 
State, doing that act is a felony, under LC. § 18-3125 and§ 18-3126, commonly referred to as 
"Identity Theft." 
Nowhere in the credit card agreement does the cardholder contract to allow the card issuer 
sell his/her financial information to a third party information broker. Remember there is no third 
party beneficiary named in the contract. Most credit card agreements no longer have as part of 
the agreement provisions for assigning the account in the event there is a default in the payment. 
EGP Investments complaint is insufficient on its face, due to there not being attached a 
contract to show a valid assignment, a legal purchase as a third party beneficiary, and without 
Chase Bank USA not being named as a party the parties to the contract are not before the Court, 
as was in the case of Capps v. FIA Card Services, 149 Idaho 737, 90 P.3d 346 (2010) and is 
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incorporated herein by its reference. 
"For example, suppose Busy Bee Grocery is owed $850.00 by Joe Debtor and 
Christensen acquires an assignment of the debt. Christensen might in turn seek out some 
individual to whom he can sell Joe Debtor's debt, and might convince Jane Doe to buy it. Instead, 
Christensen approaches Joe Debtor and convinces Joe that his life will be better if he, Joe, buys 
up the debt. The right to recover a debt is a chose in action, and no law prohibits dealing in the 
business of buying and selling choses in action." c.f Western Acceptance Corporation v. Jim 
Jones, 117 Idaho 399, 788 P.2d 214 (1990). Looking at this example we can replace Busy Bee 
Grocery with Chase Bank USA, Joe Debtor with the Appellant and Jane Doe with EGP 
Investments, Inc. We know that EGP Investments, Inc., cannot be Christensen because he has no 
assignment of the debt. Seeing other Purchase Agreements I know that EGP Investments, Inc., 
purchased only the information to the account, which is a felony under Idaho Law of I.C. § 18-
3125 and§ 18-3126 and that Chase Bank USA still owns the underlying security because they 
charge off the account and made it worthless. If Chase Bank USA sold the account to EGP 
Investments, LLC., then, they committed securities fraud, that is why they need Christensen. But 
in this case Christensen is not in the case, so standing to sue does not exist on the record, it 
cannot exist by your own example in Western Acceptance Corporation v. Jim Jones, 117 Idaho 
399, 788 P.2d 214 (1990). See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Discovery Request for 
Admissions. What's worse is that by the trial court not dismissing the case out sua sponte, it has 
aligned itself with illegal and unlawful activity in derogation of the Constitution of the State of 
Idaho and the Constitution of the United States of America. You see, Jane Doe who is EGP 
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Investments, LLC., is suing out a claim in which he has no interest in the underlying credit card 
debt. His interest is in the information obtained to harass the Appellant, in which he paid a 
stippen, probably less than $400.00, in which he is claiming his damage to be over $ 18,000.00. 
Where is the equities in that? By the way, guess who can still sue for the $18,000, that's right, 
Chase Bank USA. This is true because it is going on across this nation and is a judicial problem. 
Just so the record is complete, I do not owe EGP Investments, LLC., the monies they paid for the 
information either. The more important question here is: Is this appellate court going to stop the 
extortion, securities fraud, and racketeering from continuing created by the trial court or is it too 
also going to be enjoined in the lawlessness. 
Please understand I am not saying that Chase Bank USA may not have a claim against the 
Appellant. I'm saying that EGP Investments does not have a claim against the Appellant, when 
there was no notice of assignment provided to the Appellant as required by law, no assignment 
has been shown to exist connecting them with Chase, and no contract detailing the contractual 
obligations has been shown to exist between Chase and the Appellant or EGP Investments and 
the Appellant. 
Due to the foregoing and the absence in the record to show that Respondent is in fact a 
real party in interest entitled to the benefits of the contract, it was error for the Court to enter 
judgment against the Appellant. 
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V. Any Interest Obtained is From an Illegal Contract and is Unenforceable. 
"Whether a contract is against public policy is a question of law for the court to determine 
from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 283, 240 
P.2d 833, 840 (1952). Public policy may be found and set forth in the statutes, judicial decisions 
or the constitution. Id at 287, 240 P.2d at 842. An illegal contract is one that rests on illegal 
consideration consisting of any act or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy. 17 A 
AM.JUR.2D Contracts § 239; see Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 924 P.2d 607 (1996). A 
contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence unenforceable. 1\1iller. 129 Idaho at 351, 924 P.2d 
at 613. 
Although not clearly argued below or addressed in either the magistrate's decision or the 
district court, in Idaho a court may not only raise the issue of whether a contract is illegal sua 
sponte, Nab v. Hills, 92 Idaho 877, 882, 452 P.2d 981, 986 (1969); Belt v. Belt. 106 Idaho 426, 
430 n. 2, 679 P.2d 1144, 1148 n. 2 (Ct.App.1984), but it has a duty to raise the issue of illegality, 
whether 702*702 pled or otherwise, at any stage in the litigation. Stearns. 72 Idaho at 290, 240 
P.2d at 842. As the Court in Stearns explained: 
A party to a contract, void as against public policy, cannot waive its illegality by 
failure to specially plead the defense or otherwise, but whenever the same is made to 
appear at any stage of the case, it becomes the duty of a court to refuse to enforce it; 
again, a court of equity will not knowingly aid in the furtherance of an illegal 
transaction; in harmony with this principle, it does not concern itself as to the manner 
in which the illegality of a matter before it is brought to its attention. 
Id (emphasis added) (citation omitted) ..... Illegal contracts are void . . Miller, 129 Idaho at 351, 
924 P.2d at 613; see 17 A AM JUR 2D Contracts § 304. A void contract cannot be enforced. 
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lvfiller, 129 Idaho at 351. 924 P.2d at 613; Wheaton v. Ramsey, 92 Idaho 33,436 P.2d 248 (1968). 
A party to an illegal contract cannot ask the Court to have his illegal objects carried out, as the 
law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement, but leaves the parties where it finds them. 
Ingle v. Perkins, 95 Idaho 416,510 P.2d 480 (1973); Whitney v. Continental Life & Accident Co., 
89 Idaho 96, 403 P.2d 573 (1965); Worf ton v. Davis. 73 Idaho 217, 249 P.2d 810 (1952); Hancock 
v. Elkington, 67 Idaho 542, 186 P.2d 494 (1947)." c.f Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944 
P.2d 695 (1997). 
In this case, the purchase of financial information without the consent of the card holder is 
an illegal act in accordance with I.C. § 18-3125 and§ 18-3126 to which this Court is obligated to 
and in fact has a duty not to enforce it or any judgment when no standing exists arising from the 
illegality. "In fact this Court has a duty to raise the issue of illegality. Quiring v. Quiring, 130 
Idaho 560, 944 P.2d 695 (1997); see also Trees v. Kersey. 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 768 
(2002)." c.f Barry v. Pacific West Coast Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004). 
"The Court will not enforce an illegal contract. Quiring, 130 Idaho at 568, 944 P.2d at 
703. Illegal contracts are void, and generally the Court will "leave the parties where it finds 
them." Id.; Trees. 138 Idaho at 9, 56 P.3d at 771; Kunz v. Lobo Lodge. Inc .. 133 Idaho 608,611, 
990 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct.App.1999). This Court has stated that, "the rationale for leaving the 
parties where the law finds them is premised on the notion that both parties are equally at fault." 
Trees, 138 Idaho at 9, 56 P.3d at 771. When the Court "leaves the parties where it finds them," it 
denies recovery to either party. Morrison v. Young. 136 Idaho 316, 319, 32 P.3d 1116, 1119 
(2001); Kunz, 133 Idaho at 612, 990 P.2d at 1223." c.f Barry v. Pacific West Coast Construction, 
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Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004). 
"Idaho has long disallowed judicial aid to either party to an illegal contract. McShane v . . 
Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, 547, 277 P. 554, 559 (1929) ("No principle in law ... is better settled than 
that which, with certain exceptions, refuses redress to either party to an illegal contract."). An 
illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act or forbearance 
which is contrary to law or public policy. Quiring v. Quiring. 130 Idaho 560, 566, 944 P.2d 695, 
701 ( 1997). Generally, when the consideration for a contract explicitly violates a statute, the 
contract is illegal and unenforceable. Barry v. Pac. W Const,:, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 832, 103 P.3d 
440, 445 (2004). In most cases, the court will leave the parties to an illegal contract as it finds 
them. Id" c.f Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,200 P.3d 1153 (2009) 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Respondent failed to not only properly serve the Appellant or her husband in Accord with 
IRCP Rule 4( d)(l) and (2), but when given the opportunity to correct their error within the time 
limitation of IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) for service of a summons and complaint, they failed to correct 
the error serving the summons and complaint in accord with IRCP Rule 4( d)(l) and (2). By no 
later than June 51\ 2013, the District Court lost all jurisdiction and was required to sua sponte 
dismiss the case for lack of timely service which they failed to do so in accord with IRCP Rule 
4(a)(2) and Article I, section 18 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and the due process 
clauses of the Constitution of the State of Idaho in Article I, Section 13 and the 14th Amendment 
of the Bill of Rights Amending the Constitution of the United States of America. 
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Besides having this jurisdictional defect to continue the case due to the failure of proper 
service, the Court itself was playing its own set of games to impair the Appellant from having a 
fair and impartial hearing. With the advent of Judge Steven Yerby resigning ( quitting) his 
commission as a district court judge in mid-stream, Magistrate Barbara Buchanan was promoted 
to replace him as District Court Judge and was assigned to the case. There were no objections 
filed by the parties. To the best of the Appellant's knowledge and belief Judge Buchanan does not 
suffer from any condition which would disqualify her from presiding over this case she was 
assigned to by the Court. The Court however, scheduled proceedings foreign to the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, sent out notices not in harmony with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
detailing multiple alternative judges, which is not allowed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
or the Justices of the Supreme Court of the State ofldaho or the Legislature of the State ofldaho. 
These acts of ulta vires coupled with the Judges Yerby and Mitchell participation in this case 
without being properly assigned to the case, are acts wholly without jurisdiction and all 
determinations, rulings, judgments are null and void ab initio. As a result of the actions of the 
Court, Judges Yerby and Mitchell, Appellant's rights under Article I, section 18 of the 
Constitution of the State of Idaho and the due process clauses of the Constitution of the State of 
Idaho in Article I, Section 13 and the 14th Amendment of the Bill of Rights Amending the 
Constitution of the United States of America were violated, not to mention the that there is a 
judgment against the Appellant damaging the Appellant which can only be looked upon as a 
conspiracy to violate the civil rights of the Appellant. 
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Lastly, the Respondent themselves know they have no standing to bring this action and 
has committed a fraud upon the court. But I have no State Court to turn to because they are too 
busy not providing a proper administration of justice under the Constitution of the State of Idaho 
and being in accord with the laws of the State and Court Rules as adopted by the Supreme Court 
of the State ofldaho. 
IF Judge Buchanan would have permitted the Appellant to appear telephonically as 
requested and in accord with IRCP Rule 7(b)(4), due process could have been reached with two 
parties slugging it out between them. But the biases and prejudices of the Judges of the First 
Judicial District and I imagine the judges throughout whole State seems to be more important to 
the Judges to keep rather than their Oath of Office, Constitution of the State of Idaho and of the 
United States of America, the laws of the State and the Court Rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Idaho. The Mission Statement of the Supreme Court is a facade and 
NOBODY will have access to a court in this State for the proper administration of justice. 
History always repeats itself especially to governments which no longer serve the people in the 
manner it is suppose to, which seems to be the way of the Courts of this State. 
The obvious should not be needed to say, but I'll say it anyway. This case needs to be 
reversed, remanded back to the District Court with Orders to Vacate the Judgment and dismiss 
the case on jurisdictional grounds. Appellant needs to be compensated for the reasonable costs 
associated in defending this frivolous suit and reasonable costs on appeal. The Appellant 
requests the Court to issue all necessary Orders to reverse, remand, vacate judgments, award 
costs to the Appellant and dismiss case with prejudice. The Appellant requests the Court to issue 
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all necessary Orders to award to Appellant costs on appeal. 
Dated this 12th day of August, 2014. 
Lori Skinner, In Propria Persona 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of August, 2014, I caused to be served and delivered the 
original and Six ( 6) true and correct copies of the Appellant's Brief on Appeal and One (1) 
unbound, unstapled copy to the Supreme Court and Two (2) true and correct copies of the 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal to each party; and Certificate of Service; by the method as indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Stacey L. Wallace and Sean Beck 
Johnson Mark, LLC 
3023 East Copper Point Drive, Suite 102 
Meridian, near [83642] 
State of Idaho 
The Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Post Office Box 83 720 
Boise, near [83720-0101] 
State of Idaho 
By: 
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[ v('°U. S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] FAX Tel: 
[Uu.s. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 




















FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
EGP INVESTMENTS, LLC, a 
Washington Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LORI SKINNER, individually, and the 
marital community comprised of LORI 




PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
TO: LORI SKINNER, individually, and the marital community comprised of 
LORI SKINNER and BRET E. SKINNER, wife and husband, 
Comes Now Plaintiff, EGP Investments, LLC, by and through its attorney of 
record, Brad L.:}1/illiams, and pursuant to Civil Rule 33(a)(2), hereby submits its 







PLAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST 
fOR ADMISSION - I 
BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S. 
621 W Mallon A venue, Ste. 603 


























Requests for Admission 
ADMISSI ON NO. 1: You have no signed contract or signed application for credit which 






ADMISSI ON NO. 2: You have no signed contract or signed application for credit which 






ADMISSI ON NO. 3: You have no signed contract or signed application for credit which 






ADMISSI ON NO. 4: You have no signed contract or signed application for credit 
showing th at these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888, xxxx-
5766 was actually established by in the Defendant(s). xxxx-xxxx-
ANSWER: 
Den y. 
ADMISSIO N NO. 5: You have no written contract entitled "Cardmember Agreement" 
Chase Bank USA or such other name that states the terms and conditions from with 




PLAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST 
ON-2 FORADMISSI 
BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S. 
621 W Mallon A venue, Ste. 603 


























ADMISSI ON NO. 6: You have no written or signed contract with Chase Bank USA 
stating wh at the Defendant(s) would be responsible on any charges made on the account 






ADMISSI ON NO. 7: You have no merchant sales receipts showing the charges that were 
n these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888, xxxx-incurred o 
xxxx-xxxx -5766 with the alleged sums in your complaint. 
ANSWER: 
Ad mit. 
ADMISSI ON NO. 8: You have no contract with Chase Bank USA assigning you to 
collect thes 
xxxx-5766 
e alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888, xxxx-xxxx-





ON NO. 9: That it is true that neither Chase Bank USA or any other name it 
1s not registered with the Secretary of State of Idaho to conduct business in 
required by Assumed Business Name Act. this state as 
ANSWER: 
Den y. Plaintiff lacks the knowledge to either admit or deny the request. Therefore, 
e same. Plaintiff cannot testify to the business practices of Chase Bank. it denies th 
ADMISSI ON NO. 10: That EGP Investments, LLC purchased "charge-off' accounts 
Bank USA or through a third party. from Chase 
ANSWER: 
Ad mit. 
ADMISSI ON NO. 11: It is true that you paid for these "charge-off' accounts is 
y less than the debts alleged to be owed to Chase Bank USA. substantiall 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST 
ON-3 FORADMISSI 
BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S. 
621 WMallonAvenue, Ste. 603 



























Objection. Relevance. The amount paid is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff used the 
credit card and has a balance due and owing. Without waiving their objection Plaintiff 
will respond that it did not pay the charge-off balance to purchase the account. 
ADMISSION NO. 12: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does have a purchase 




ADMISSION NO. 13: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does NOT have a purchase 




ADMISSION NO. 14: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does have a collection 




ADMISSION NO. 15: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does NOT have a collection 




ADMISSION NO. 16: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does NOT know the "charge-





LAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST 
OR ADMISSION - 4 
BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S. 
621 WMallonAvenue, Ste. 603 




























ADMISSION NO. 17: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does know the "charge-off' 
full account numbers from Chase Bank USA for any alleged accounts concerning the 
Defendant( s ). 
ANSWER: 
Admit. 
ADMISSION NO. 18: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC failed to respond to a debt 
verification letter concerning any of these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxx-




,ADMISSION NO. 19: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC has NOT failed to respond to 
a debt verification letter concerning any of these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, 




,ADMISSION NO. 20: It is true that based upon an actual signed contract with Chase 
Bank USA for alleged account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, you have no actual knowledge of 
any provision within said contract which allows for debt transferability by sale to a third 
party. 
,ANSWER: 
Objection. The Plaintiff cannot respond to the vague and ambiguous term 
"contract" with Chase Bank. Plaintiff's knowledge only extends to the Cardholder 
Agreement that governs the terms and conditions of the credit cards in question. 
,.ADMISSION NO. 21: It is true that based upon an actual signed contract with Chase 
Bank USA for alleged account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888, you have no actual knowledge of 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSION - 5 
BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S. 
621 W Mallon A venue, Ste. 603 












any provision within said contract which allows for debt transferability by sale to a third 
party. 
ANSWER: 
Objection. The Plaintiff cannot respond to the vague and ambiguous term 
"contract" with Chase Bank. Plaintiff's knowledge only extends to the Cardholder 
Agreement that governs the terms and conditions of the credit cards in question. 
ADMISSION NO. 22: It is true that based upon an actual signed contract with Chase 
Bank USA for alleged account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-5766, you have no actual knowledge of 
any provision within said contract which allows for debt transferability by sale to a third 
party. 
,ANSWER: 
Objection. The Plaintiff cannot respond to the vague and ambiguous term 
"contract" with Chase Bank. Plaintiff's knowledge only extends to the Cardholder 
Agreement that governs the terms and conditions of the credit cards in question. 
12 ,ADMISSION NO. 23: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does not have ANY signed 
agreements/contracts with the Defendant(s) pertaining to Chase Bank USA alleged 















,ADMISSION NO. 24: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does not have ANY signed 




.,ADMISSION NO. 25: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does not have ANY signed 
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621 W Mallon A venue, Ste. 603 


























STATE OF WASHINGTON 




Brian Fair, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the Member-Manager of EGP Investments, LLC, Plaintiff in the above-
entitled action; that he has read the above and foregoing answers to Defendant's Request 




SIGNED AND SWORN to (or affirmed) before me this ~ - day of-February, 
2013, by Brian Fair. 
Print Name: (kl,\,'\£. €.. b,d ll"d.- th~voo-.... 
NOTARY PUBLIC, state ofWashingto 
My Commission Expires: 12 / { ~ /,b 
I am an attorney for the party a~swering these discovery requests; that I have read 
the discovery requests propounded to Defendants and the answers and objections, if any, 
thereto, know the contents thereof and believe the same to be true. 
Brad L. Williams, ISB#3976 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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FOR ADMISSION - 7 
BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S. 
621 W Mallon A venue, Ste. 603 
Spokane, WA 9920 I 
(509) 456-5270 
